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1765 
JUDICIAL RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTION: 
RESPONSES TO PROFESSORS RAMSEYER  
AND REPETA 
SHIN-ICHI NISHIKAWA

 
COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR RAMSEYER’S ARTICLE, DO SCHOOL CLIQUES 
DOMINATE JAPANESE BUREAUCRACIES? EVIDENCE FROM SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS 
On September 11, 2010, I received an e-mail from a graduate of my 
seminar. He passed the entrance examination to the Shiho Kensyujo (Legal 
Training and Research Institute, or LTRI). The Ministry of Justice 
(Homusho) had announced the results two days prior. He and I are both 
graduates of Meiji University. Because of Professor Ramseyer’s Article,1 I 
will not advise the graduate to be a judge.
2
 I do not think that he could be 
on his way up the ladder as a judge. He did not attend the University of 
Tokyo. 
Recently, I published my book Saibankan Kambujinji no Kenkyu 
(Research on Personnel Management of Senior Judges in Japan).
3
 In this 
book, I pointed out that many judges who attended the University of 
Tokyo have served as chief judges of the district courts, family courts, or 
both, and have become presidents of the high courts.
4
 The ratio is 18.0%.
5
 
In the case of judges who graduated from private universities, however, 
the ratio is just 2.1%.
6
 In my book, I could not explain this gap well. Had I 
read Professor Ramseyer’s Article while writing my book, I would have 
been able to explain the gap more clearly. 
By way of inquiry, I have three technical questions. The first is about 
how to measure the productivity of judges. In the case of three-judge 
panels, to whom is the productivity attributed? I think it is very difficult to 
 
 
  Professor of Political Science, Meiji University.  
 1. J. Mark Ramseyer, Do School Cliques Dominate Japanese Bureaucracies? Evidence from 
Supreme Court Appointments, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1681 (2011). 
 2. I was especially surprised by Professor Ramseyer’s findings regarding the very high 
productivity of the men named to the Supreme Court, most of whom attended the University of Tokyo. 
See id. at 1694–95. 
 3. SHIN-ICHI NISHIKAWA, SAIBANKAN KAMBUJINJI NO KENKYU [RESEARCH ON PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT OF SENIOR JUDGES IN JAPAN] (2010).  
 4. Id. at 71. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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measure the productivity of each judge in a three-judge panel, unlike 
single-authored cases. It is true that Machida Akira, a former chief justice 
of the Supreme Court of Japan, published massive numbers of opinions 
from 1962 to 1965.
7
 He was not, however, the most senior judge on his 
panel in those days because he was not a full judge.
8
 
The next question is about how to determine the rate of failure on the 
entrance examination for the LTRI. From Zensaibankan Keireki Soran 
(Career Data on All Judges, or ZSKS), we know data such as judges’ birth 
dates, but we cannot ascertain the number of times a judge failed the 
entrance examination for the LTRI. Some judges might have failed the 
entrance examination for college. If a judge got into college after failing 
the exam on his or her first attempt, we must deduct the number of 
additional attempts on the college entrance exam from the number of times 
the judge failed the entrance examination to the LTRI.  
Similarly, some judges might have repeated the same year while at 
college. For example, Eda Satsuki, a former judge and ex-president of the 
House of Councilors, repeated the same year twice.
9
 He passed the 
entrance examination to the LTRI, however, on his first attempt. 
Therefore, we cannot always correctly estimate the number of times a 
judge failed the LTRI entrance examination from his year of birth.  
The third question is also related to ZSKS. There are several blanks in 
the alma maters category in ZSKS. In other words, there are a lot of judges 
whose alma maters are not listed in ZSKS. I counted the blanks of the 
LTRI classes of 1959 to 1961, and there are 79 blanks in this period.
10
 Of 
course, the implications of this number should not be neglected. The 
number is about thirty percent of the total number of the LTRI classes of 
1959 to 1961.
11
 Out of those 79 judges, some may be graduates of the 
University of Tokyo or Kyoto University.  
In any case, thanks to Professor Ramseyer’s Article, I realized how 
significant productivity actually is and how wrong my assumptions about 
university pedigree truly were. 
 
 
 7. Ramseyer, supra note 1, at 1694. 
 8. ZENSAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [CAREER DATA ON ALL JUDGES] 100 (5th ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter ZSKS]. 
 9. See EDA SATSUKI, http://www.eda-jp.com (last visited May 2, 2011). 
 10. ZSKS, supra note 8, at 84–101. 
 11. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/16
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 COMMENTS ON PROFESSOR REPETA’S ARTICLE, RESERVED SEATS ON 
JAPAN’S SUPREME COURT 
I wrote my Article Saikosai no Rutsu wo Saguru (How Was the 
Japanese Supreme Court Created After World War II?) two years ago.
12
 
The objective of my Article was similar to that of Professor Repeta’s,13 
and thus I found his Article very interesting. His Article revealed that I 
had overlooked the importance of attorneys in my Article. I neglected the 
Attorneys Act, and I took the process of appointing attorneys to the 
Supreme Court lightly. I only paid attention to the conflict among the 
Hosono group, the Ministry of Justice (Shihosho), and occupation 
officials. 
After reading Professor Repeta’s Article, I also understood that it was 
very important for attorneys to be appointed Justices of the Supreme 
Court. It was vital for the democratization of Japan, and it was also very 
interesting for the Supreme Court and the executive branch to have 
opposed passage of the Attorneys Act.
14
 
I think that the Advisory Committee for Appointing Justices of the 
Supreme Court (Saibankan Nimmei Shimon Iinkai) was very significant, 
primarily because the committee produced a list of candidates. At first, the 
committee proposed by Shihosho had only one attorney as a member.
15
 
Then, the committee established by the Yoshida Cabinet had three 
attorneys.
16
 The Katayama Cabinet, however, established a committee of 
fifteen members including four attorneys;
17
 the number of attorneys on the 
commmittee was increasing.  
Of course, the more attorneys the committee has, the more attorney 
candidates it selects. Shihosho did not show disagreement toward the 
increase of attorneys, and I do not know why. It is possible that Shihosho 
was too busy negotiating with the Hosono group and occupation officials. 
Or Shihosho might have considered that all attorneys had a similar way of 
thinking. As Professor Repeta pointed out, every attorney had been trained 
under a constitutional order that denied the primacy of individual rights.
18
 
 
 
 12. Shin-ichi Nishikawa, Saikosai no Rutsu wo Saguru [How Was the Japanese Supreme Court 
Created After World War II?], 78 SEIKEI RONSO 1–82 (2009). 
 13. Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1713 
(2011). 
 14. Id. at 1715. 
 15. Nishikawa, supra note 12, at 35. 
 16. Id. at 39–40. 
 17. Id. at 48–49. 
 18. Repeta, supra note 13, at 1716. 
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As a result, the advisory committee of the Katayama Cabinet selected 
eleven attorneys, ten career judges, and nine intellectuals as candidates.
19
  
In addition, this Article refers to the voting process by judges to select 
their representatives to the advisory committee at the Katayama Cabinet.
20
 
At that time, attorneys also selected their representatives by voting. I am 
interested in this process as well. It is my task, and also possibly Professor 
Repeta’s, to make the process more clearer. 
 
 
 19. Nishikawa, supra note 12, at 56. 
 20. Repeta, supra note 13, at 1718. 
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